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Mechanisms of Online Dispute Resolutions

          Prajwal Basnet           Mail: [email protected] National Law University, Delhi In the Internet context parties located in different parts of the world make contracts with each other at the click of a mouse. However, litigation for these disputes is often inconvenient, impractical, time- consuming and expensive due to the low value of the transactions and the physical distance between the parties. Online Dispute Resolution (ODR) is often referred as a form of ADR which takes advantage of the speed and convenience of the Internet and ICT. ODR is the best option for enhancing the redress of consumer grievances, strengthening their trust in the market, and promoting the sustainable growth of e-commerce. With the increase in practice of ODR after the pandemic, the mechanisms for it ought to and have been seen to be more optimized than ever before for the parties’ convenience and it binding nature even more imperative. It is from this fact that to come up with innovative ways about regulating an ODR, it would be crucial in firstly understanding the nature and the mechanism of an ODR. The means of ODR for filing consumer class action suits and in general many of the disputes has been of growing importance since the past year due to the threat imposed by the coronavirus and imposition of the lockdown. Online Dispute Resolutions has positive side as well as drawbacks in its operation. As a result, the technicalities for its proper conduct still needs much scrutiny for proper regulation even though the platform has been on a constant path of recognition and progression through the enactment of major treaties such as the New York Convention and the ECC (2005 UN Convention on the Use of Electronic Communication in International Contracts), UNCITRAL, etc.  Descriptively speaking, there are two dimensions to an online dispute resolution. Talking about one dimension regarding the access and convenience, traditional dispute resolution takes place where the parties and mediators/arbitrators must be present at the same location together and at the same time. Conversely, an online dispute resolution is not synchronous to the former as the three actors are not needed in a simultaneous presence for the relevant process of hearings. This would be of cost benefit for them as their time and travel to the location and also of their worktime would be preserved.[1]  Online dispute resolutions on the other dimension, facilitates the use of information communication technology (ICT) as a facilitator of the proceedings and sometimes also as a substitute for judicial function assumed by the arbitrators. The main functions of ICT in an online resolution process are: ICT also has function much greater than acting as a mere tool for the parties in conducting online proceedings. In an automated negotiation (also known double-blind bidding), the parties are more concerned with coming to a settlement than with disputing the liability. Hence the relevant software is fed with up to three offers (bids having been hidden) that proceed to settle disputes when the offers come within the range that is pre-set or even during a midpoint. From the outset, the parties are bound to oblige the binding nature of the settlement that is produced by the software. Online dispute resolutions are operated by a platform that is linked to a trade association or an arbitral institution where the parties fill in a claim from through online that directs to appropriate processes with applicable remedies which are then sent to negotiation and finally the process of arbitration.[3] Before the outbreak, ODRs were generally held for consumer disputes that would concern small claims[4] which obviously is not the case anymore as it began to cover ADR disputes of wide subject-matter in as much as to replace ADR at some point during the peak of the pandemic. Due to this, the working mechanism ought to be much optimized for the efficiency and conveniency of the parties. Online Dispute Resolutions (ODR) are not directly controlled through any specific instruments or sort of mechanism that would govern it like a traditional arbitration process. The fact stands still even for ODRs that are held for Consumer Disputes. The legal principles that it is based on, are same as its counterpart i.e. based on the text of the 2013 Consumer ADR Directive.[5] It is different from the offline process because both the consent to arbitrate and the rest of the proceedings themselves are conducted online (or both online or offline). Nowadays, online arbitration is also increasing for to be used for business-to-consumer (B2C) relationships along with traders and other commercial actors that are governed under the principle of consumer law and consumer arbitration therefore apply mutatis mutandis. However, opposed to the theoretical example, in practical sense, it is seen that the ODR needs more uniformity, clarity and sensible regulation. Talking about the consent to enter into an arbitration agreement, in the traditional method where the consent is of paramount importance, in online process there are many instances where consent of the parties are precluded in an agreement with the company owners. For example: A client or customer cannot waive or exclude such clause specifically where such clause is an intrinsic part of the purchase or other online agreement.[6] Hence, the whole industry is subject to this form of arbitration. Such clauses according to relevant consumer protection directives would be regarded as unfair. Hence, it can also be seen that such cases are of such nature that the consent is well replaced by the fairness that assists in regulating smooth conduct of online arbitration. The nature of the issuance of arbitral awards and the outcomes of mediation were, and in some cases, still subjects that were ambiguous and dynamic but have undergone gradual progressive changes in their regulation. Even though online arbitration is being recognized and enforced does not make its decision binding or final in many of the disputes. It is mostly up-to the parties’ will to render a decision binding.[7] The parties can only choose for it to be conditionally binding or unilaterally

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HYBRID ADR by Ritika Kedia

As an extension of ADR, a new practice called “HYBRID ADR” has recently come into practice. Hybrid ADR means nothing but combining various traditional methods of dispute resolution to suit the different needs and preferences of various parties. This can be a useful approach particularly when the dispute is complex and requires a more tailored solution than what traditional ADR methods offer.For example, in a hybrid mediation-arbitration process, the parties first attempt to resolve their dispute through mediation, but if they are unable to reach an agreement, the mediator will become the arbitrator and make a binding decision on the dispute. In a hybrid negotiation-arbitration process, the parties first attempt to negotiate a settlement but if they cannot agree, they will move to arbitration and if the arbitration also doesn’t succeed, the parties can move into litigation.Hybrid ADR can offer several benefits over traditional ADR methods. Firstly, it can be more flexible, allowing parties to customize the process to their needs. Secondly, it can save time and money, as parties can avoid a lengthy court process by resolving their dispute through ADR. Finally, it can be more effective, as it allows parties to use a range of methods to achieve a resolution that works for them.However, hybrid ADR also has some potential drawbacks. The process can become more complex and confusing if parties are not familiar with the different ADR methods. Additionally, parties may not agree on the order or combination of ADR methods to use, which can lead to delays and impasses.Overall, we can say that hybrid ADR is an innovative approach to resolving disputes that allows parties to tailor the process to their needs, and can result in more efficient, effective, and satisfactory outcomes.

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Call for Blogs

Message from the Blog Team ECI’s Blog Team invites original contributions from students, researchers, academicians, legal practitioners, and those who are passionate about ADR, with the objective of facilitating a dynamic academic discourse and widening the scope for creative research works in the field of ADR. We highly encourage the authors to take a multidisciplinary approach when addressing pertinent research areas in the field of ADR. If you are willing to make an academic contribution in this field, ECI is your platform to be! SUBMISSION GUIDELINES Content: Owing to the nature of the journal, we shall only accept entries that are related to Alternative Dispute Resolution (‘ADR’). ·The entries must showcase a predominant link to ADR. All the authors are requested to send only Original Content. All the submissions shall go through a mandatory process of plagiarism check. Covering Letter: Submissions must be sent to [email protected]. ·All submissions must be accompanied by a cover letter, containing the name of the author/s, institutional/organisation affiliation, title and category of the submission and a contact address of the author, including the e-mail address and the phone number. Submissions should be sent as MS word (.doc format) attachments with the title of the article as the file name. The author is also requested to attach an image to accompany the piece. However, this does not form a mandatory requirement. The image should be representative of the submission’s topic, area, or argument. It should be high quality (upwards of 1000p) and have an aspect ratio of 1:1 (Square). Detailed guidelines – https://excuriainternational.com/guidelines-for-blog-submission/

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Сross-Border Enforcement of Settlement Agreements

– Written by Dmitry Davydenko* It is always important to find ways to settle disputes amicably. This is especially true nowadays when numerous obstacles hinder the proper performance of contracts, especially international ones. In particular, pandemic-caused restrictions lead to numerous situations where a party becomes unable to perform a contract or such performance becomes impractical. Apart from that, for instance, in Russia – West or Iran – US context, business relations meet severe challenges. If parties solve a dispute through a court procedure, it becomes especially difficult to get a judgment or an award recognized and enforced internationally. Arbitrating a dispute remains an option but it may take much time and effort and the result sometimes, unfortunately, proves unenforceable for various reasons, even though some positive recent cases do exist. Therefore, the ideal solution for the parties consists in showing wisdom and cooperating in the spirit of good faith, doing as much as possible to keep the contract, or if it gets impossible, terminating relations in a way that no one feels offended and wants to retaliate. One of the most appropriate legal instruments for that is the settlement agreement. I. The settlement agreement in domestic and international law Although many people have an idea about settlement agreements, still understanding of this legal instrument in various legal systems differs. The substantive laws of many States of continental Europe contain provisions for a settlement agreement. For example, the French Civil Code expressly governs “Contrat de transaction”, and the Italian Civil Code has similar (but far from identical) rules on the transaction. In some post-Soviet States, only procedural law expressly governs settlement agreement, rather than substantive law. Many other jurisdictions provide for no express regulation of this contract, so it just exists in practice.  Unfortunately, parties sometimes fail to fulfill a settlement agreement. When parties decide whether to conclude such an agreement, they often have serious concerns about how to ensure its performance. This becomes especially relevant in the international context when the parties locate their enterprises or businesses in different states, with the result that the assets of one party appear hardly accessible to the other. Summing up, the parties who take the decision “to settle or not to settle” have a legitimate interest in ensuring the cross-border enforceability of the agreement.  International law contains scarce regulations on the cross-border enforceability of the settlement agreement. The only universal instrument has become the Singapore Convention, but it governs only the cross-border enforceability of settlement agreements reached as a result of mediation. Meanwhile, if a settlement agreement is reached as a result of mediation properly conducted then normally its content corresponds to the interests of the parties. Ensuring its expedient performance is praiseworthy but the Singapore Convention will likely need much time to become effective and universally accepted.  Another problem with the convention remains in the fact that it constitutes the fruit of international compromise; otherwise, it would not be possible to reach a mutually acceptable solution while negotiating and drafting the convention. As such, it does not establish expedient enforceability. It just specifies uniform rules pursuant to which a party may ask the competent court to enforce the agreement, but the other party has quite plenty of opportunities to oppose the enforcement, much more than the party opposing the enforcement of the arbitral award under the New York Convention 1958. For instance, under the Singapore Convention, the opposing party may allege that the content is contrary to applicable law, that it is not operative, void on some grounds, and that there may be several other reasons. As a result, the court procedure concerning enforceability will likely take quite some time and thus become burdensome. Therefore, other ways to ensure cross-border enforceability of settlement agreements apart from the Singapore Convention need exploration.  II. Legal opportunities for enforcement of settlement agreements Currently, the common denominator consists in enforcing the settlement agreement as an ordinary contract. As a result, the respective procedure will be judicial and, likely, more or less lengthy. If the settlement agreement contains an arbitration clause, the enforcement may perhaps become more expedient, as in many jurisdictions arbitration normally takes less time and resources than court litigation. It also frequently remains a good option to consider including in the settlement agreement a mediation clause in addition to an arbitration clause so that it will increase the chance of voluntary compliance with it and then, if necessary, of its enforceability by arbitration.  III. Differences in the governing law matter when drafting a settlement agreement The method of enforcing a settlement agreement will often depend on the legal system concerned in the said agreement. These differences require consideration when choosing law applicable to the substance of the settlement agreement. The remedies in case of non-performance of the settlement agreement would depend not only on the content of the agreement itself but also on the applicable law. In civil law countries, a more likely legal remedy will consist of specific performance of the agreement if it contains a duty to take some actions, e.g. to surrender the property. In common law countries, the primary remedy will include damages. For example, under Australian law in case of breach of contract normally a court or tribunal would award damages, while specific performance would become an applicable remedy only in relation to some unique objects for example real estate objects which are not something that cannot be required in the market. A similar approach exists in Swiss law. On the contrary, usually in civil law jurisdictions, specific performance would constitute an ordinary remedy and the court or tribunal would award damages only if specific performance proves impossible in a particular case.  Furthermore, the way how in case of litigation a judge or an arbitral tribunal will interpret the mutual rights and duties of the parties will also depend on the applicable law. Again, different legal traditions exist as regards the legal doctrine of force majeure. Thus, common law generally contains no default rule on force majeure so what parties include in the settlement agreement will become their force majeure event. In contrast, civil

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Law Applicable to International Settlement Agreements

– Written by Dmitry Davydenko* A Settlement Agreement is usually defined as an agreement by which parties settle a dispute or a legal uncertainty in their relations, normally through reciprocal concessions. It is expressly governed in the civil codes of France, Italy, and several other states as a sui generis contract. Its causa, therefore, consists in the settlement (extinguishing) of a dispute or legal uncertainty. The issue of determining the law applicable to an international settlement agreement becomes relevant when a dispute arises out of or in connection with such agreement, or its validity is challenged. Then it may become necessary to interpret the agreement and determine the rights and duties of the parties. Applicable law turns out to be relevant and even crucial in the context of enforcement of the settlement agreement. For instance, United Nations Convention on International Settlement Agreements Resulting from Mediation (Singapore Convention) provides in Art. 5(1)(b)(i) that the competent authority of the Party to the Convention may refuse to grant relief at the request of the party relying on the settlement agreement if the other party furnishes to the competent authority proof that the settlement agreement is null and void, inoperative, or incapable of being performed under the law to which the parties have validly subjected it or, failing any indication thereon, under the law deemed applicable by the competent authority of the Party to the Convention where relief is sought. Meanwhile, the issue of law applicable to the international settlement agreements is studied insufficiently compared to various other issues of private international law/conflict of laws. This article proposes a brief analysis of basic principles of conflict-of-laws analysis to determine law applicable to settlement agreement with a foreign element (resulting from cross-border relations). Connecting factors analysis should start from lex voluntatis. Indeed, express or implied choice of law by the parties should be respected. However, parties sometimes do not choose applicable law in settlement agreement for various reasons, e.g. such agreement is concluded at the “eleventh hour” after difficult talks when the parties’ negotiators areexhausted and wish to quickly conclude the agreement before any of them changes their mind. They may also consider choice-of-law clause unimportant on the ground that dispute is already settled. If no law is chosen, then several other connecting factors need to be considered. Law of the place of conclusion of the settlement agreement (lex loci contractus) may be considered relevant presuming that the parties should reasonably take into account the law of the jurisdiction where they enter into their agreement. However, such a place may be simply random and chosen merely out of convenience. It hardly has any bearing on the parties’ relations. Furthermore, an agreement may be concluded through electronic communication, without a personal meeting of parties. Therefore, thisconnecting factor appears not satisfactory. Another approach would be to rely on characteristic performance of the parties. Such test underlies, e.g., Article 4(2) of Rome I Regulation: “Where the contract is not covered by paragraph 1 or where the elements of the contract would be covered by more than one of points (a) to (h) of paragraph 1, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country where the party required to effect the characteristic performance of the contract has his habitual residence.” However, then a question arises what kind of performance should be considered characteristic of a settlement agreement. Its purpose consists in extinguishing a dispute: a claimant party usually waives their right of claim in exchange for some reciprocal step from the other party, such as accord and satisfaction. Therefore, waiver of rights/claims may often be characteristic of such agreement. Indeed, for instance, the United States tends to consider the settlement agreement as a special contractual type with consideration granted specifically for termination of a legal dispute.However, both parties may undertake to waive certain rights to settle the dispute. Consequently, application of characteristic performance test will not always be appropriate. Third option to explore would be lex loci solutionis (place of performance). Unlike the previous approach, this one features not the place of the performer, but the place of the performance itself. However, both parties may undertake to make certain steps to perform a settlement agreement. The agreement may also consist in refraining from actions (e.g. recognition of certain property title of the other party; a non-compete obligation) rather than active performance. Therefore, the test may not always be possible to apply. Fourth option relies on accessory nature of settlement agreement. Indeed, it is a derivative agreement, which is always based on some previous relations of the parties. Consequently, it appears to be logical to apply the same law as to the underlying relations (contractual or other). The same legal regulation of previous and subsequent relations, e.g., a contract and its modification by settlement agreement, gives the parties greater confidence in the existence, exact content and enforceability of their rights. Where a settlement agreement creates completely new obligations, rather than modifies previous relations, it would be more appropriate to apply the closest connection test. For instance, Article 4(4) of Rome I Regulation provides that “Where the law applicable cannot be determined pursuant to paragraphs 1 or 2, the contract shall be governed by the law of the country with which it is most closely connected.” To determine the law most closely connected to the settlement agreement one should consider the subject and circumstances of the conclusion and performance of the settlement agreement, both previous and subsequent, e.g. place of negotiations; in which state the main part of the obligations under the terms of the settlement agreement is to be fulfilled (lex loci solutionis); parties’ places of residence/center of business; other relevant factors. Based on the forgoing the author’s conclusion is that, unless the parties agreed otherwise, and unless otherwise follows from the settlement agreement, it shall be subject to the law applicable to the relations which gave rise to the settled dispute. However, the settlement agreement may deal with a complex conflict. That is, the underlying relations may be

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The Stovepipe Program

A disquisition on the ‘Stovepipe Program’ Like moths to a flame, conflicts are a necessary component of human relationships, to which workplace relations are not immune. The workplace houses a gamut of individual interests that are bound to clash. From the way a colleague opens the door (you’d be surprised at certain pet peeves that some people have) to the usage of unprofessional email salutations all the way down to employment termination. The workplace clashes range from personal interests to aggregate interests to financial interests among a list that is supposedly endless. Well, the stovepipe program is not for the resolution of pet peeves, or is it? This piece outlines and discusses the stovepipe program. It is an employment dispute resolution system agreed upon prior to a dispute by parties, between the employer and employee usually, that utilises arbitration administered by neutral institutions. The 21st-century workplace, particularly the big corporations, has shifted its recourse from reactionary measures like resorting to litigation to proactive measures where disputes are mutually deliberated upon and wisely so. For context, eLawForum, a premier business-to-business exchange for legal services, estimates that the total cost of litigation spent by Fortune 500 is to be $210 billion, equivalent to one-third of the after-tax profit of the Fortune 500, in the past 8 years thereby dwarfing CEO compensation. So much for so little; what is at best integrated reactionary measures such as the ombudsman program and open-door policies were subsequently popular as compared to proactive measures like the stovepipe. However, these integrated reactionary measures have one problem in common. Structural bias is a general concern for the employee where these measures are utilised. The reason being both the systems are financed by the company itself, and consequently, the company’s interest in the scheme of things may surpass that of the claimant. The thought of it might just be likened to reporting a culprit to himself, more often than not he’d take his own side! Moreover, the satisfactory resolution of conflict may engender a sense of fairness that structural bias incinerates: that the claimant has been heard, treated with respect, and interests met or at worst acknowledged. In considering dispute resolution generally, it could be administered by one sole party, by the two parties, or by a third party. The first two measures are designed and masterminded by one of the disputing parties. The other party may not feel a sense of fairness in this process compared to the remaining parties. Alternate Dispute Resolution methods such as mediation generally fall within the purview of the second measure in which case both parties shoulder the responsibility of resolving the dispute to a neutral third person. Both the parties can easily succumb to the resolution achieved faster because of the inclusivity it affords. The third measure allows parties to submit their dispute to a neutral party for resolution like the stovepipe program. The institution that administers this resolution may or may not be privatized. An example of a public institution is the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission which hears cases related to employment disputes in America. While an example of a private institution is the International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, their Administered Employment Arbitration Rules go so far as necessitating the arbitrator to justify the rationale behind the decision arrived at. While the success of this program in workplaces is debatable, however, in theory, it best serves commercial needs of expediency. One last feature about the Stovepipe program; remember Santa Claus and the myth that he gets into the house on Christmas eve through the chimney, also called stove pipe? The stove pipe is a long pole that only filters out smoke and that is how tight and confidential the Stovepipe Program is considered to be; nothing can go in or out. Except, of course, Santa.

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Relevance of Counsel Ethics in International Arbitration

What ECI thinks of: Relevance of Counsel Ethics in International Arbitration Program ~Authored by Prantika Dutta  “International arbitration dwells in an ethical no man’s land…where ethical regulations should be, there is only an abyss.”‘Counsel Ethics’ is presently identified as a gray area of arbitration which delves into the code of conduct the counsels are required to adhere to for fair and just adjudication in arbitration proceedings. The development of international arbitration over the past century is of unique character – despite being connected to various State jurisdictions, it is autonomous in its own nature. In its developing stages, the world of international arbitration was majorly obscured due to multiple countries’ transnational complexities. However, in its history of existence, international arbitration has entered a crucial juncture where cognizance is being taken by the global nations to analyse its nature, purpose, and legitimacy thereby making the role of counsels and their ethical compass ever-prominent. Transnational dealings of affairs are a breeding ground of ensuing problems in international arbitration in the absence of backing of foolproof laws and regulations. There is a compelling need and relevance for the enactment of a fair Code of Ethics in international arbitration and its recognition by transnational institutions. In tandem with its growing popularity as a viable alternative to traditional courtroom litigation, the international arbitration community has noticed the need for certain changes in the law to make the system more just for the parties who opt for international arbitration, and in turn, be attuned to the changes in the contours of arbitration. International arbitration is less recognizable as a form of “alternative dispute resolution” than as a type of “offshore litigation” This transformation has been both celebrated and decried as the “judicialization” of arbitration.The core ethical issues raised regarding the arbitration are consent, choice, confidentiality, and conflicts of interest. Scholars believe what encompasses core ethical values in an arbitration question can be answered along the lines of maintaining truthfulness, fairness, independence, loyalty and confidentiality by the parties involved in the arbitration including the arbitrators and the counsels. However, what constitutes ‘core ethical values’ majorly depend on cultural and ethnical background along with legal backdrop. Studying counsel ethics is a complex issue due to the underplay of not only different laws but also incompatible laws at one issue. There exist vast differences between the treatment of counsel ethics across civil law and common law countries that are bound to clash in an international arbitrational setup. The system of international arbitration has come under fire for its lack of code of conduct for counsels which in turn challenges the delivery of justice to the parties involved. There are no well-structured legislations governing the ethical codes for counsels appearing before an international arbitration. It is regulated under laws such as International Chamber of Commerce (“ICC”), London Court of International Arbitration (“LCIA”), SIAC (“Singapore International Arbitration Centre”), but they are yet to deliver a concrete regulation on counsel ethics despite it being a hot potato in the field of international arbitration. The presence of clear ethical codes affirms the existence of a dependable system of arbitral enforcement that the parties from various nations can resort to in order to resolve their transnational disputes. It has to be evolved into a fully operational international adjudicatory procedure, which aims to effectively guide and monitor the conduct of the counsels who take part in this discourse. The implementation of proper ethical codes ensures that inappropriate behaviour of the counsels will be viewed as an ‘aberration’ in an otherwise healthy system rather than it being a “symptom of lurking systemic pathologies” which risks jeopardizing the credibility of an entire mechanism of transnational dispute resolution.

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Group of Companies Doctrine: A Contentious Principle in ADR

– Written by Harshita Seksaria * Introduction One important aspect of arbitration is that mutual consent should exist between the disputing parties stating that they wish to resort to arbitration in situation when any dispute arises. In fact, it is very important that for a valid arbitration agreement to exist, there needs to be consensus ad idem. However, even though this doctrine of mutual consent is established in arbitration, there are a variety of other legal doctrines that come into play as well in order to adjudicate the dispute in the fairest manner. One such doctrine which has raised many eyebrows across all jurisdictions is the “group of companies” doctrine, it is highly contentious for its application, validity and correctness. In simple terms, ‘group of companies’ doctrine allows a non-signatory to become a part and be included to an arbitration agreement, this is due to the fact that such a non-signatory might belong to the same group of companies as one of those who is a signatory to an arbitration agreement leading to the fulfillment of the following conditions, i.e., i) the non-signatory to the agreement played an important role in either the performance or conclusion of the main contract which consists of the arbitration agreement, ii) the common intention of the signatories was to also bind the non-signatory to the agreement[i]. However, this doctrine also seems to be contrary to the principle of separate legal entity which is in existence in both civil and common law jurisdictions. This doctrine acts as exception to the pre- condition of consent when a multi-party arbitration scenario exists. Here, there is a consent of the tributary companies however when it comes to the parent company, they are not included in the original arbitration agreement. This doctrine is widely based on the principle of agency as well as implied consent. International perspective of the doctrine The theme of “group of companies” doctrine was initiated in the Barcelona traction case. In this case it was observed that the concept of separate legal entity is not absolute and occasionally its disregard may be justified. However, the actual doctrine emerged in the case of Dow Chemical[ii], where it was held that those non- signatories that had a major role in carrying forward the performance of the contract can become a party to an arbitration proceeding, merely establishing corporate ties with the signatory is not a sufficient parameter and in this case the non-signatory which was a parent company controlled and directed the actions of the signatory company which was understood as implied consent to also bind the non-signatories to the arbitration agreement. A major turning point in the application of the doctrine roughly after 20 years of its existence was noted in the case of  Peterson farms v. CM farming.  In this case the court observed that the concept that has been established behind the doctrine needs to be derived and not applied, this was because it was losing its meaning due to direct application without providing any kind of rationale behind it. In order to keep the doctrine relevant and evolving, its important to derive its application. In the case of Darlah Real Estate,  while the UK courts held that the Pakistan government didn’t have any direct connection with the main contract and any agreement with a state entity is different from having an agreement with a state. This decision was then appealed in the court of Paris where it was observed that Pakistan was a party to the economic transaction of the trust and so it will be rightfully assumed that they had knowledge about the contract therefore clarifying their implied intent of indulging in the same. Here it can be noted that both the courts while applying the same legal principle, had a different outcome. The former focused on intention while the latter tried to understand commercial relations as well as presumed intent. All these cases give a clear picture that the application of this doctrine has evolved with time and is still expected to expand and grow as and when the complexities increase. Also, while this doctrine has been accepted under French law, the application of this doctrine has been rejected by the English courts. However, US while not recognizing this doctrine has in fact identified five separate doctrines on the basis of which a non-signatory can become a party to an arbitration agreement and these are(i) Estoppel; (ii) Incorporation by Reference; (iii) Assumption; (iv) Agency; and (v) Veil piercing/Alter Ego[iii]. Indian Perspective on this Doctrine This doctrine is a novel concept under the Indian jurisprudence and just like various other jurisdictions, even here the doctrine is not expressly identified and recognized by the Act[iv]. In Indian jurisprudence the obligation of a non-signatory to an arbitration agreement can be extended largely on the basis of Chloro Controls India (P) Ltd. v. Severn Trent Water Purification Inc.. Here the court established that “it is very pertinent to understand the intention of the parties before extending the scope of the arbitration agreement to signatory and non-signatories as well”. In order to understand the scope of the doctrine, the court had also set out four factors that have to be taken into consideration while applying this doctrine i.e., i) establish a ‘direct relationship’ between the non-signatory and the signatory to the arbitration agreement; ii) establish clear intention to bind the non-signatory to the arbitration proceeding as well; iii) the third party (non-signatory) is directly involved in the termination or the execution of the contract; iv) both the signatory and the non-signatory form a tight single economic unit. This judgement had completely altered the way this doctrine was viewed, as prior to Chloro Controls Judgement, the courts in the case Sukanya Holdings v. Jayesh H. Pandya did not refer the dispute to arbitration because they were of the view that since some of the parties were non-signatories to the arbitration agreement therefore the claim fell outside the ambit of arbitration. However, the judgment of Sukanya Holdings

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ARBITRABILITY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS DISPUTE IN INDIA

– Shreya Bansal * It is stated in Article 89 of the Civil Procedure Code that “If the court deems fit, it can allow arbitration, mediation and conciliation for settlement of disputes between parties outside the court.[i]” This section expressly means that power has been inferred to court to refer matters to alternate dispute mechanisms(“ADR”). However, many disputes have always been under contention if the same can be resolved outside the courts. One such area is the disputes arising out of intellectual property rights (“IPR”). Arbitration as a means of resolving commercial disputes has become progressively the default mechanism around the world and in India. Indian Courts have also been trying to enlarge alternative dispute mechanism scope so as to reduce the burden on courts. Courts are trying to settle the practices of ADR and are coming up with various tests to determine the arbitrability of disputes. One such area of contention is regarding the arbitrability of Intellectual Property Disputes . The courts have at multiple instances said that IPR Disputes are to be considered non-arbitrable. The major reason for such a decision is that public policy aspects are believed to be involved in IPR disputes which makes it against the public interest if such disputes are made arbitrable. Further, the lack of clarity regarding the arbitrability of IPR disputes in the statutes such as Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 and other intellectual property statutes makes the issue more complex. The supreme court has attempted to settle the issue regarding arbitrability of disputes in the case of Vidya Drolia.[ii] The Supreme Court while delivering its judgement laid down the law on arbitrability of disputes generally and the forum to decide upon the question of \’non-arbitrability\’ of a dispute. However, the concern around arbitrability of IPR disputes still remain. The judgement has inducted Intellectual property as monopolistic rights, subsequently indicating them as non-arbitrable. This concern has recently been addressed by the Delhi High court in its recent decision of Hero Electric.[iii] Arbitrability of disputes has been determined till 2020 by the decision of the Supreme court of India in the case of Booz Allen Hamilton v SBI Home finance[iv]. It was held by the court that where the disputes involved in personam rights, the same shall be considered arbitrable. However, when the dispute shall involve a right in rem, the same shall be considered non-arbitrable. The court considered the dispute regarding mortgaged property sale and held that since such dispute involved right in rem, the same shall be considered non-arbitrable. Further disputes such as those relating to rights and liabilities that arise out of criminal liabilities, guardianship, matters, matrimonial matters, winding up or insolvency matters, eviction or tenancy matters, and testamentary matters were enumerated as non-arbitrable. While questions regarding when disputes were arbitrable were dealt with in the Vidya Dolia and Booz Allen case, the arbitrability of Intellectual Property disputes was specifically addressed in the case of Eros International Media Limited v. Telemax[v], where it was held by the Bombay High Court that certain disputes of Intellectual Property were arbitrable. The court was approached under Section 8 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The dispute was regarding the marketing and distribution rights of feature film and the defendants conduct in this regard. With respect to the arbitrability of IP rights, the court observed that IP rights are a species of property rights and cannot be considered as a separate body of law. The court held that IPR disputes of commercial nature where the parties required ‘specific reliefs’ against the other party i.e., actions in personam, are arbitrable. A four-fold test was thereafter created by the court in the case of Vidya Drolia that determines arbitrability of disputes. The court specified four instances when disputes will not be arbitrable. First when the statute barred the subject matter from arbitration, second, when the subject matter or cause of action related to right in rem, third, when it affected rights of the third party, and fourth, when it related to alienable functions of state. Certain IPR issues such as issuing patents and trademark registration have been considered as exclusive matters having an erga omnes effect that fall within the sovereign functions of the state by court. Since monopoly rights are granted, they are to be considered non-arbitrable. While some confusion is created by such an obiter, the same is not to be considered as blanket prohibition. The case of Hero Electric Vehicles Private Limited[vi] resolved the ambiguity in 2021 where the Delhi High court held that Intellectual Property disputes are arbitrable. The case pertained to infringement of trademark where the application to refer the dispute to arbitration was filed. Since the issue in the present case centred around two contractual arrangements of Family settlement Agreement and Trademark and Name Agreement, the remedy is not sought for someone using deceptive trademark but for the right conferred to a different family group under business division and the essential issue was not provision of trademark act but the provisions of the agreement, the same can be effectively adjudicated by arbitration. The court clarified that the concern identified in the case of Vidya Drolia does not affect the present judgement as firstly no sovereign functions are involved and secondly, it does not fall into the categories of non-arbitrable disputes listed in Vidya Drolia. Further, the court held that courts must caution and differentiate between actions in rem and rights in rem. When the remedy is sought against a particular person or group as in the present case of Hero Electric case, the same would not constitute an action in rem and therefore would not have an erga omnes effect. The Hero Electric judgement is welcome. Even though IP is a special form of property as it is intangible in nature, it is not very different from other species of property. With other forms of property, IP requires registration. In modern commercial contracts, IP forms an essential element very often and allowing such disputes to be arbitrated

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The Question of Arbitrability in India

What is Arbitrability -Shashank Mehrotra* In simple terms, arbitrability refers to the determination of whether a legal dispute should be resolved by the process of arbitration. Arbitration is a process in which a dispute is submitted, by agreement of the parties, to one or more arbitrators who make a binding decision on the dispute. In choosing arbitration, the parties opt for a private dispute resolution procedure instead of going to court. The concept of Arbitrability could be seen to stem from Article II of the New York Convention[i], which provides for each state to have a written document signifying the “subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration.” Article V of the same convention reinforces the concept of arbitrability by laying down that a court can set aside an arbitral award if it finds that the subject matter of the arbitration was not capable of being arbitrated upon by the state’s municipal laws. Such non-arbitrability of a dispute renders the entire agreement invalid, which puts the dispute beyond the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal, and the award unrecognizable and unenforceable. Importantly, Arbitrability may refer to three questions- “Whether there is an arbitration agreement? Whether the dispute is beyond the scope of the agreement? Whether the subject matter is arbitrable?”[ii] The Statutes Although the question of arbitrability has largely been left for the courts to determine, sections of the Indian Arbitration Act do have some references to Arbitrability giving courts broad contours to operate within while adjudicating upon the same. Section 2(3) of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 recognizes non-arbitrability by laying down that if certain disputes by virtue of laws applicable must be referred to a particular court, they may not be referred to Arbitration. Section 34(2)(b) and 48(2) of the Act further lay down that courts are empowered to set aside the award granted on the grounds that the subject matter of the dispute is not arbitrable.  Critically, the Act does not specifically demarcate those subject matters which would not be arbitrable, and this was left to the courts wisdom to decide ex visceribus act. We shall now look at how the Courts have approached this problem over time. I. The Booz Allen Case The question of arbitrability is one, which according to the Booz Allen[iii] case, revolves around the determination of three factors. Firstly, whether claims made in certain scenarios that the subject matter of the dispute is one which cannot be determined by a private tribunal but a public tribunal such as a court of law. Secondly, whether the dispute is one which is covered by the arbitration agreement, or if it falls under the “excepted matters”, hence taking it out of the purview of arbitration. Thirdly, the dispute must be one which has the capability of being adjudicated upon and settled by arbitration. The Court importantly noted here that the “nature of rights” was a key element in the determination of arbitrability as well. Only disputes arising out of claims of violation of rights in personam could be arbitrable, and not those concerning rights in rem. However, the court also held, taking note of a statement given by Mustill and Boyd[iv], that subordinate rights originating from rights in rem would remain arbitrable. The Court further noted that though some issues highlighted in the mortgage suit filed were arbitrable, their mere presence in the suit would not render the whole suit arbitrable. Those issues in the suit though capable of being arbitrable in themselves, could not be divided from the mortgage suit. The Court borrowed the reasoning from its earlier decision in Sukanya Holdings (P) Ltd. v. Jayesh H.Pandya[v] to back its decision, and rule that bifurcation of claims of arbitration was not possible. II. Vidya Drolia Case Recently, the Supreme Court in Vidya Drolia[vi]case made further observations, giving four concise principles. The Court importantly re-affirmed that bifurcation of claims for arbitration was not possible. Bifurcation here refers to having only some claims to be decided by the tribunal and others by a court. This, the court observed, would defeat the purpose of the Arbitration Act itself as it would lead to an increase in litigation costs and time consumed. The Court further differentiated between non-arbitrable claims and non-arbitrable subject matter. It described the former as those claims which are outside the purview of the arbitration agreement, as well as those which are not capable of being resolved through arbitration. Non- arbitrability of subject matter on the other hand implies that the dispute is one which cannot be legally referred for arbitration because of a law to the contrary. The court further clarified the ‘nature of rights’ issue as analyzed by Booz Allen. The Court here asserted that the rights approach may be fallacious keeping in mind the interplay of the rights in rem and personam. The court instead laid down that the distinction which must be noted is one between the judgements in rem and the judgements in personam. Importantly, the judgements in rem would operate against the whole world, and those in personam would only operate with respect to the contesting parties. Therefore, arbitration awards only acting as the latter would be legal and not those having an erg omnes effect. The court also held that the disputes involving sovereign functions of the state cannot be held to be arbitrable and must be decided by a judicial forum. Moreover, matters concerning divorce, patents, and citizenships cannot be arbitrable unless expressly allowed by a legislation. This is an affirmation of the principle of subjective arbitrability originating from the UK according to which the State may not enter into the arbitration process because of its status or a particular function.[vii] Subjective Arbitrability, also known as “arbitrability ratione personae”, is defined as the ability of individuals and entities to submit their disputes for arbitration. It covers the capacity of the parties to contract and submit disputes for arbitration, and finds recognition in Article V(1)(a) of the New York Convention.  Across the world, it mostly finds application in acting as

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